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Abstract: The recent enlargement of exclusion from patentability of inventions on human 
embryonic stem cells (hESC) by the uniform approach of European Courts imposes a 
reorganization of hESC’s research and development strategies. 
 
Main text: 
Patentability of inventions on human embryonic stem cells (hESC) has been recently 
restricted both by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). Although they are not bound together as they rely on two different European 
Organizations, respectively the European Patent Organization and the European Union (EU), 
their decisions provide a uniform exclusion of patent on hESC obtained via the destruction of 
human embryos (Table 1).  
 
Context 
On 25 November 2008, in the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation case (here after the 
WARF case), the enlarged board of appeal of the EPO (here after the enlarged board), 1 
considered that the non-patentability of inventions using human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes forbids to grant European patents to products which	  could be prepared, 
at the filing date and as described in the patent’ claims, exclusively by a method destroying 
necessarily an embryo. While it decided that products prepared exclusively by a method 
involving the destruction of human embryos, at the patent filing date, are not patentable, the 
enlarged board let open a possibility of patent for products and methods using hESC available 
in biobanks as previously derived from hESC lines.2 
 
On 18 October 2011, in the Brüstle v Greenpeace eV case (here after the Brüstle case)3 the 
CJEU broadly interpreted the patent’s exclusion for uses of human embryos for commercial 
or industrial purposes. First, it defined widely the notion of human embryo as “any human 
ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a 
mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division 
and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis”. Second, it excluded from 
patentability an invention where the technical teaching of the patent application requires the 
prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, whenever such destruction 
takes place and even if the claims’ description does not refer to human embryos’ use. Most 
scientists acting in the field of hESC research have been worried by the Brüstle case as it 
prohibits hESC’s patents that could be obtained in the USA or Asia.4 
 
The Technion case 
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On 4 February 2014, in the Technion Research and Development Foundation case (here after 
the Technion case),5 the technical board of appeal of the EPO (here after the technical board) 
decided to align with the Brüstle case instead of keeping the door open by its own 
organization in the WARF case. The Technion case was brought up by a company established 
in Israel, a State which is neither part of the European Patent Organization nor of the EU. The 
Technion Company applied to obtain a European patent on a cell culture comprising both 
human foreskin cells and hESC as well as on methods of maintaining hESC in an 
undifferentiated state. The patent was refused by the examining division of the EPO because 
hESC lines used to carry out the invention were not publicly available at the filing date of 
application. Thus, it considered the only possibility to obtain the hESC necessary to realize 
the claimed method relied on the destruction of human embryos. Following the company’s 
appeal, the technical board of the EPO adopted its decision: although serious doubts remain 
on the public availability of the hESC lines described in the application, it decided to maintain 
the patent’s refusal on the basis of the necessary prior destruction of human embryos to 
establish the cell lines.  
The two main arguments used by the company Technion were rejected by the technical board. 
On the one hand, it was not possible to pass through the door let open in the WARF case: 
using methods based on commercially or otherwise publicly available hESC lines which do 
not involve de novo destruction of human embryos do not prevent the exclusion from 
patentability. Indeed, although the technical board examined the cell lines claimed to be 
publicly available at the date of application, they all resulted from the initial destruction of 
human embryos through the use of the inner cell mass of blastocyst for their derivation. It also 
noted that no evidence on file proved that	  hESC lines allegedly available from the US NIH	  
were obtained by methods which do not involve the destruction of human embryos. 
On the other hand, the argument of a too wide exclusion because of the consideration of all 
the steps prior to an invention was considered irrelevant as in the WARF case. Indeed, the 
invention has to be viewed globally without singularizing persons involved or points in time 
of the different steps resulting in the invention at stake. In such context, the technical board in 
the Technion case considered that all steps preceding the invention were “a necessary 
precondition for carrying out the claimed invention”. 
Thus, the exclusion from patentability is considered extensively in the Technion case which is 
in line with the Brüstle ruling of the CJEU while closing the door let opened by the WARF 
case. Indeed, the Technion case excluded from patentability “inventions which make use of 
[hESC] obtained by de novo destruction of human embryos or of publicly available hESC 
lines which were initially derived by a process resulting in the destruction of the human 
embryo”. 
 
With the Technion case, a better uniformity of European patent law is clearly and legally 
settled between the EPO and the EU.6 Both for European patents under the EPC, and for 
national patents within the EU Member States which have to implement the Brüstle case, it 
will be applied that hESC technologies will not be patentable if the used hESC are obtained 
from the destruction of human embryos whenever is the point in time at which such 
destruction takes place.  
 
Arguing patentability refusal on hESC research pathways 
Surely the Brüstle case7 and even more, the Technion case will have an impact on the 
organization of hESC innovation pathways as it covers the whole Europe beyond the EU 
Member States. However, the positive or negative influence of such decisions on hESC 
research as arguments, are balanced (Table 2). Indeed, regarding hESC research financing, the 
fear of private investments diminution8 can be nuanced by the fact that fundamental research 
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should not be directly impacted by decisions related to patenting and is mainly funded by 
public institutions. It should be highlighted that, explicitly from 2006, the EU does not fund 
research activities that destroy human embryos including for the procurement of stem cells, 
although it funds the subsequent steps involving human embryonic stem cells.9 It has been 
argued that societies and researchers (whom careers partly rely on patents obtained) will move 
towards more liberal countries where financing are available.10 However the opposite may 
also be true: American Biotechnologies societies may move to Europe to escape patents 
burden in the USA or in Asia11 The exclusion from patentability may also delay medical 
applications as an impediment to the commercialization of cell therapies based on hESC4, 8 
whereas it may also have no major impact7 in this area. Furthermore such decisions may be 
seen as expressing that hESC research is considered immoral11 whereas science regulation 
and intellectual property should not get mixed up.7 Moreover, in such a context of legal 
clarification on patentability with stem cells, some argued they never thought it will be 
possible to obtain patent on hESC in case of embryo destruction.11 It can also be considered 
these legal decisions have a limited impact in the lights of future technological developments: 
12 it is still possible to obtain patents where hESC are obtained without embryo destruction13 
and IPS may provide new patent possibilities. While patents as such can be seen as necessary 
for investors, notably as they limit secrecy, patents’ unavailability permits higher freedom of 
activities (no fear of patents’ rights infringement, no royalties to pay for exploitative license) 
and other means to stimulate innovation can be used. The latter can be scientific (not so easy 
to copy in the field of hESC, protection by process to deliver cells or to control the quality in 
manufacturing),4 regulatory (data protection, marketing authorization, other incentive 
legislations on biosimilars or on orphan drugs) and economic (commercial secret, incentive 
tax).7 
 
The imperative reorganization of research and development strategies 
The exclusion from patent of hESC cell lines, where they have been obtained through the 
destruction of human embryo whenever such destruction takes place, is now a certainty in 
Europe as it is based on two distinct legal bases: the CJEU and the EPO decisions. It can be 
considered as having an ethical basis, rather than a technical one. Such ethical barrier to 
patentability is also exhibited in the 2013 decision of the US Supreme Court on the 
patentability of genes which excluded isolated DNA naturally produced from patentability.14 
There seems to be a clear difference done between research to generate knowledge and 
patents that are intended to generate commercial activities. 
It is now realistic to consider that most of the hESC lines worldly available at the moment 
cannot be used to obtain patents in Europe. To obtain patent in the field of hESC, researchers 
will have to use hESC lines derived without destruction of human embryo, or IPS lines, 
although the equivalence between the two sources is not established. To this end, it could be 
recommended to hESC repositories to address clearly the techniques used for obtaining the 
lines and to make this information available to researchers. Another possibility could be to 
require this information to be systematically described, as a standard, in the European hESC 
registry. However, if using hESC lines derived without destruction of human embryo avoid 
the ethical problem of the destruction of potential human being it does not solve that of using 
embryo for commercial and industrial purposes. The issue of non-commercialization of the 
human body is major, with reference to the context of human organs trafficking and it is 
emphasized with hESC compared to adult stem cells. That is why, the derivation of IPS lines 
is a research direction widely explored at the moment. Indeed, if focusing on IPS while using 
hESC as “a gold standard” brings to conclusive results for medical applications, legal 
decisions on non-patentability of hESC from destructed embryos will have less consequence 
on innovation. If not, incentives for hESC could be re-opened through patent, based on 
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utilitarian reasoning and patient benefit otherwise unattainable, although this is far to be 
probable. In any cases, both ways would take years of research. Thus, hESC research towards 
innovation faces a re-organisation imperative, as one route for future exploitation is clearly 
blocked in Europe, whereas doubts were permitted before the Technion case. This impacts on 
research strategies; it requires a more profound re-organisation from companies who had bet 
on patenting hESC lines and organized accordingly their long term business plan. It rather 
gives an advantage to those who had invested at a rather short term without building primarily 
on such patents. It is now necessary to find new strategies of innovation that do not rely on 
patent. They can rely on other existing tools such as the scientific, regulatory and economic 
ones above-mentioned or they can rely mainly on national strategies, applying only to 
national patents without envisaging European level patenting. So far, in Germany for 
example, the precise description of a method which does not destroy embryo is not required 
by the German Federal Court to grant a patent.15 However, this is limited to national patents 
and can only be a short term strategy. As a matter of fact, it can be anticipated that the 
restrictive approach exhibited in the Technion case will also be retained to grant the future 
European patents with unitary effect as it will also be delivered by the EPO. 
 
Table 1: Recent European cases on the exclusion of patentability of hESC in Europe 
 
Organisations European Patent Organisation European Union 
Main legal 
texts 
 
European Patent Convention16 Directive 98/44/EC on the 
legal protection of 
biotechnological 
inventions  
Patents scope European patents National patents 
Legal bodies European Patent Office Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
Grand Chamber 
Enlarged Board 
(higher board) 
Technical Board 
Cases WARF case 
25 November 2008 
Technion case 
4 February 2014 
Brüstle case 
18 October 2011 
Exclusion of 
hESC’s patents 
-necessary 
destruction of human 
embryos 
-at the patent’s filing 
date 
-destruction of human 
embryos 
 
-whenever the 
destruction takes 
place 
-destruction or use as a 
base material of human 
embryos 
-whenever the destruction 
takes place 
Cases 
territorial 
implementation 
All contracting States to the European patent 
Convention 
28 EU Member States + 9 other countries 
28 EU Member States 
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 Table 2: The balance of arguments on patent exclusions’ influence on hESC research 
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